This paper studies implementation in a principal-agent model of adverse selection.
INTRODUCTION
In an ideal world of certainty, costless information, and observability, it would be difficult to explain many observed institutional practices. For example, what would be the demand for accounting activities in such a world? Within a firm, a central decision maker could make globally optimal decisions and direct subordinates to implement centrally determined plans. In order to better understand the role of incentives and information asymmetries within firms, the principal-agent model explicitly incorporates these forces.
Designing an optimal mechanism for an informationally decentralized organization may seem like a daunting task. However, an important result in the mechanism design literature, the Revelation Principle (see, for example, Myerson [1979] ), often simplifies this task. The Revelation Principle states that any equilibrium outcome of any mechanism can be achieved as an equilibrium outcome of a revelation mechanism and, moreover, as an equilibrium outcome under which the agents truthfully reveal their private information.
One problem with restricting attention to revelation mechanisms is that they are often plagued by multiple equilibria (unwanted coordination). For example, suppose a central manager compares the budget proposals submitted by two division managers to determine the final budget for each division. Even when truthful revelation of information by both division managers is an equilibrium in their subgame, nontruthful reporting may also be an equilibrium. For example, both managers may choose to "pad" their budgets.
Moreover, the undesirable equilibrium may Pareto-dominate (from the division managers' perspective) the desirable equilibrium.
The multiple equilibria problem has been studied in the implementation literature.
The objective is to construct a mechanism under which the equilibrium outcomes coincide with those prescribed by a given allocation rule. Most papers study general settings and the focus is on what allocations can and cannot be implemented, not on the form of the implementing mechanisms. Many of the mechanisms rely on tricks that exploit weaknesses of the solution concept employed (for example, by using integer-game constructions), employ infinite message spaces, ignore mixed strategies, and are difficult to relate to observed institutional practices. (See Jackson [1992] , Moore [1992] , and Palfrey and Srivastava [1993] for discussions.)
Given the generality of the settings studied, the complexity of the mechanisms employed is not surprising. However, even in simple settings, the implementing mechanisms are often more complicated than one might expect. For example, in Demski and Sappington's [1984] principal-two agent model of adverse selection in which each agent's type can take on only one of two values, the implementing mechanism constructed by Ma, Moore, and Turnbull [1988] employs an infinite message space (but not an integer game).
In this paper, we explore the ways in which common assumptions in the principalagent literature on adverse selection simplify the implementation problem. 1 One such assumption is that the agents' preferences satisfy the single crossing property. In singleagent models of adverse selection (e.g., Mirrlees [1976] and Spence [1980] ), the single crossing property has been used because of its intuitive interpretation in applied settings and because it limits the number of constraints that need to be considered in solving an adverse selection problem (Cooper [1984] ). The single crossing property has also been shown to simplify the design of contracts by a principal who contracts with multiple riskneutral agents (Mookherjee and Reichelstein [1992] ). 2 We begin with the simplifying case in which the agents (but not the principal) have complete information about the state of the world. A well-known necessary condition for 1 The implementation problem has also been studied in principal-agent models of moral hazard (see, for example, Mookherjee [1984] , Ma [1988] , , Sjöström [1996] , and Brusco [1997] ). 2 Mookherjee and Reichelstein study a model in which a planner contracts with riskneutral agents who are assumed to have preferences over allocations that satisfy the single crossing property and types that are uncorrelated. They identify a monotonicity condition for the public decision rule under which Bayesian Nash incentive compatible allocation rules can be equivalently implemented in dominant strategies. exact Nash implementation is Maskin Monotonicity (see Maskin [1977] ). We show that, if the agents' preferences satisfy the single crossing property, then all allocation rules satisfy Maskin Monotonicity.
In the principal-agent literature, one role for the principal is in relaxing budgetbalancing constraints (Holmstrom [1982] ); the sum of the payments to the agents does not have to equal zero. Moreover, the principal is often assumed to be able to impose large (out-of-equilibrium) monetary penalties on agents. With these additional assumptions, we show that the principal can implement any allocation rule via two rounds of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies in a finite mechanism.
While the solution concept employed--two rounds of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies--ensures that a unique Nash equilibrium (in pure and mixed strategies) is obtained, it makes less demanding behavioral assumptions than Nash equilibrium. As long as each agent is rational (which implies that he does not play strictly dominated strategies) and knows that all other agents are rational, he will play a strategy that survives two rounds of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies (Tan and Werlang [1988] ).
In contrast, the tightest sufficient conditions that have been given for players to play a Nash equilibrium are that, in addition to the above assumptions, the agents have either mutual knowledge (in games with 2 players) or common knowledge (in games with 3 or more players) about other agents' beliefs over each others' strategies (Aumann and Brandenburger [1995] ).
Under complete information, the single crossing property facilitates implementation via the iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies. In its absence, implementation has otherwise been achieved in a solution concept more demanding than Nash equilibrium (undominated Nash equilibrium; as in Jackson, Palfrey and Srivastava [1994] and Sjöström [1994] ).
For exact implementation in undominated Nash equilibrium or "virtual" implementation via the iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies (as in Abreu and Matsushima [1992] ), one needs only to be able to find some allocations that can be used to test the agents' preferences. 3 For exact Nash implementation, one has to be able to test the agents' preferences starting from equilibrium points (Maskin Monotonicity). The single crossing property allows the principal to test the agents' preferences starting from any allocation. An example is used to illustrate the importance of being able to test preferences from a potentially large number of starting points, including "penalty allocations." Without this large number of starting points, exact implementation cannot be achieved via two rounds of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies if attention is restricted to domination by pure strategies. The situation is different if dominance by mixed strategies is allowed. In this case, implementation can be achieved even if the penalty allocations cannot be used as starting points to test preferences.
We then turn to the case of incomplete information (and return to dominance by pure strategies). The corresponding condition to Maskin Monotonicity is Bayesian Monotonicity (Jackson [1991] , Palfrey and Srivastava [1989] , Postlewaite and Schmeidler [1986] ). Another necessary condition for exact Bayesian Nash implementation is incentive compatibility. We use an example to demonstrate that the single crossing property and incentive compatibility do not imply Bayesian Monotonicity. We then show that the single crossing property and strict incentive compatibility do imply Bayesian Monotonicity.
One way to interpret this result is that if one starts from an allocation rule that is only weakly incentive compatible, the principal may have to settle for implementing some nearby allocation rule that satisfies strict incentive compatibility. That is, the principal may have to settle for approximate implementation. Hence, in our model, there is a distinction between complete and incomplete information settings. It is only in latter that one has to 3 Abreu and Matsushima [1992] show that, under complete information and a mild restriction on preferences, any allocation rule can be virtually implemented via an arbitrarily large number of rounds of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies. The assumption of large penalties we make allows us instead to achieve implementation in two rounds; the single crossing property facilitates exact implementation.
turn to approximate implementation. Put differently, there is a connection between binding incentive compatibility constraints and approximate implementation.
Our example shows that some special situations require approximate implementation, but is approximate implementation needed in standard settings such as that of Demski-Sappington? Using a result from Jansen [1981] , we observe that, if there are only two agents, no finite mechanism can exactly implement any allocation rule that satisfies only weak incentive compatibility. This includes the second-best solution in the Demski-Sappington setting. Hence, without turning to approximate implementation, the Ma, Moore, and Turnbull [1988] mechanism is as simple as one can hope in terms of the size of the message space.
A feature of the Demski-Sappington model is that the outcome set has a product structure. The setting is one of relative performance evaluation across two agents with no production interdependencies. We show that in a generalized version of the DemskiSappington model (with any finite number of agents and types) any incentive compatible allocation rule can be approximately implemented via two rounds of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies in a finite mechanism. 4 Our result on approximate implementation in incomplete information environments is a generalization of the mechanism constructed in Glover [1994] for the Demski-Sappington model. The point is that what is important about the Demski-Sappington model in terms of easing implementation is the product structure and the single crossing property, not the number of agents or types.
Under incomplete information, the single crossing property makes it possible to use a deterministic mechanism; in its absence, a randomized mechanism can be used (see Arya, 4 Without making our product structure assumption, Duggan [1997a] obtains a permissive result for the case in which the agents' preferences are quasi linear. In a principal-multiagent model of adverse selection in which the agents have incomplete information, he constructs a simple extensive-from mechanism that exactly implements any incentive compatible allocation function in sequentially rational strategies (a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium).
Glover, and Young [1995] ). One problem with randomized mechanisms is that, although the desired allocation rule is implemented with probability 1-ε, some other, perhaps very undesirable allocation rule, is implemented with probability ε.
The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the complete information case, and Section 4 analyzes the incomplete information case.
MODEL
A principal contracts with n agents, n For expositional convenience, we assume that if an agent's preference characteristic (type) is higher, he enjoys a higher utility level: if θ i , θ' i ∈ Θ i and θ' i > θ i , then u i ( . ,θ' i ) > u i ( . ,θ i ). An essential assumption (and the focus of much of our analysis) is that the agents' preferences satisfy the single crossing property:
For all (y,x) ∈ Y × X, if θ i , θ' i ∈ Θ i and θ' i > θ i , then 5 The finiteness of Θ i is a limitation of our paper. For a recent insightful analysis of the implementation problem in which Θ i is allowed to be infinite, see Duggan [1997b] . He studies virtual Bayesian Nash implementation.
The single crossing property states that agent i's preferences are revealed by his marginal rate of substitution between y i and x i .
There are a number of well-known multiagent settings in which the agents' preferences have been assumed to satisfy the single crossing property that are encompassed by our model. 6 (Alternatively, we could restrict attention to allocation rules that prescribe interior 6 The examples are taken from Mookherjee and Reichelstein [1992] . Implementation in the sense of Definition 2 implies exact Nash implementation in both pure and mixed strategies. However, less demanding behavioral assumptions than Nash are made. 7 For now, we consider only domination by pure strategies. As we show below, allowing for mixed strategies makes the implementation problem easier. We explore this case in Proposition 3.
Maskin Monotonicity is a necessary condition for exact Nash implementation. It requires that, if an allocation rule prescribes allocation (y,x) in state θ and, in state θ', (y,x) is preferred to all the allocations it was preferred to in state θ, then the allocation function continues to prescribe (y,x) in state θ'.
DEFINITION 3. An allocation function f satisfies Maskin Monotonicity if for any
pair of states θ, θ' ∈ Θ and any outcome (y,x) = f(θ), (y,x) ≠ f(θ') implies that there exists an agent i and an allocation (y',x') such that u i (y' i ,x' i ,θ' i ) > u i (y i ,x i ,θ' i ) and
In the definition above, agent i is referred to as the "test agent," and the allocation (y',x') is referred to as the "test allocation." If the second inequality is strict, we say the allocation rule satisfies strict Maskin Monotonicity. All proofs are presented in an appendix. 8 Using a solution concept that makes more demanding behavioral assumptions than Nash (undominated Nash), Jackson, Palfrey, and Srivastava [1994] and Sjöström [1994] identify domain restrictions under which mechanisms with a small message space can be used to achieve exact implementation. The domain restrictions they identify are preference reversal, the existence of a worst outcome, and that the environment be separable. An environment is separable if, for any given allocation and any subset of the agents, it is 8 In a conversation a number of years ago, Matt Jackson suggested that there might be a connection between the single crossing property and Maskin Monotonicity. possible to find another allocation under which the given subset of agents is indifferent between the worst outcome and the new allocation, while the other agents are indifferent between the given allocation and the new allocation (assuming the planner knows what the state is). The worst outcome and separability assumptions enable the planner to impose severe penalties on a given subset of the agents without punishing the remaining agents.
In our setting, x i is agent i's monetary payment. Hence, we assume the planner can severely punish agent i by choosing a sufficiently small x i (i.e., a large penalty). The product structure of X ensures the remaining agents can be left unaffected. Since Θ is finite, the large penalties assumption does not require X i to be unbounded from below.
Our large penalties assumption and proposition on simple mechanisms for complete information environments are stated below.
(A.1). For any allocation rule f = (y,x) and any i ∈ Ν, there exists P i > 0 such that The idea behind the mechanism used to achieve implementation in the proof of Proposition 2 is along similar lines to the mechanisms constructed in Jackson, Palfrey, and Srivastava [1994] and Sjöström [1994] . Agent i submits two messages--his first message is on his own type, while his second message is on his neighbor's (agent i+1's) type. The allocation is as prescribed by f under the preference profile defined by all agents' second messages, unless there is some agent whose second message is different than his neighbor's first message. In the event of such a difference, the allocation is perturbed.
These perturbations are chosen so that each agent always has strict incentives to report his first message truthfully. Hence, the first round of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies has each agent reporting his first message truthfully.
Agent i is severely punished if his second message is inconsistent with agent i+1's first message. Large penalties are used to ensure the penalty agent i receives when his second message disagrees with agent i+1's first message is large enough to outweigh any benefit agent i might receive by lying with his second message. 9 Hence, given all agents report their first messages truthfully, the second round of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies has each agent reporting his second message truthfully. 10 The single crossing property is used in the proof of Proposition 2 to provide each agent with strict dominant strategy incentives to report his own type truthfully. In order to accomplish this, one has to be able to find the appropriate test allocation for each agent and from a large number of potential starting points (depending on the announcement of other agents). It is the large number of potential starting points that requires a single crossing property-like condition in lieu of Maskin Monotonicity which only guarantees the right sort of test allocations from equilibrium points. 11 Implementation via the iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies requires allocations to be similar to each other in their ability to be tested. The following example illustrates the need for preference reversal at points other than equilibrium points. If Y has a product structure, i.e., Y = Π i∈N Y i , a mechanism can be constructed that uses only arbitrarily small penalties. 10 A related result is presented in Piketty [1993] . Piketty studies a generalized taxation problem in which the agents' preferences satisfy the single crossing property. He assumes each agent (and the planner) knows the ex post distribution of types. This assumption implies nonexclusive information, i.e., any n-1 of the agents, by pooling their information, have complete information. Under these assumptions, Piketty shows the first-best allocation rule can be exactly implemented not in two but in z (the number of types) rounds of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies. 11 We thank the associate editor for pointing this out to us. The first (second) entry in each cell is 1's (2's) payoff.
Although no strategy is strictly dominated by a pure strategy, any strategy that has an agent reporting his own type falsely is strictly dominated by a suitable convex combination of the two pure strategies in which he reports his own type truthfully. Once these dominated strategies have been removed, in the remaining subgame, each agent reporting his own type (first message) and the other agent's type (second message)
truthfully is a strict dominant strategy.
The key to the example is that the penalty allocations cannot be used as starting points to test preferences. This problem would also arise when agents have to be excluded from participation in order to punish them. For example, in determining the optimal level of an excludable public good (for example, the quality of country club facilities), it may be necessary to exclude individuals from membership if they are to be sufficiently punished.
To study punishment by exclusion, return to the model, except that each agent can be either excluded and receive an exclusion consumption bundle e i or included and receive a bundle (y i ,x i ). x i is a payment, as before. Let ∆(M i ) denote the set of probability distributions on M i . Now, a pure strategy m i is strictly dominated by a mixed strategy
PROPOSITION 3. Assume (A.2), each agent observes θ, and domination by mixed strategies is allowed for. Then any allocation rule can be exactly implemented via two rounds of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies by a mechanism under which
The proof of this proposition is essentially the same as that of Proposition 2, except that, at the first round of deleting dominated strategies, no strategy is strictly dominated by any other pure strategy. However, all strategies in which an agent misreports his own type are strictly dominated by a mixed strategy that involves true reporting of own type.
The approach of studying domination by mixed strategies may turn out to be useful in other settings in which "punishment" allocations do not satisfy preference reversal. For example, in pure exchange economies, a natural way to punish an agent is to destroy his consumption bundle (see Jackson, Palfrey, and Srivastava [1994] )--such allocations cannot be used to test an agent's preferences as long as more of a good is preferred to less of that good.
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
We now assume each agent knows only his own type. Agents have beliefs about the actual preference profile. These beliefs arise from the application of Bayes rule to a common prior probability distribution satisfying p(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, and Σ θ∈Θ p(θ) = 1.
We assume p(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. Let p i (θ i ) denote the marginal probability of θ i : p i (θ i ) = Σ {θ'∈Θ | θ' i = θ i } p(θ'). The beliefs of agent i who has observed θ i are represented by the conditional probability distribution q i (θ -i | θ i ) over Θ -i : 
If the second inequality is strict, we say the allocation rule satisfies strict Bayesian Monotonicity. Another necessary condition for exact Bayesian Nash implementation is incentive compatibility. 
, and x 1 (θ) = x 2 (θ) = 0 otherwise. Truthful reporting is an equilibrium under the direct revelation mechanism (Θ,f). However, so is the strategy combination that has agent i, i = 1, 2, reporting his type is 2(1) when it is 1(2). Moreover, agent j's conditional distribution over agent i's messages is independent of which of these two strategies agent i adopts, i ≠ j. Hence, agent j cannot be induced to upset the nontruthful equilibrium by turning agent i in for adopting the nontruthful strategy. Also, since f satisfies the incentive compatibility inequality only weakly, if agent j is provided with incentives to upset the nontruthful equilibrium by turning himself in for a deviation from the truthful strategy, he is also provided with incentives to falsely turn himself in when both agents are adopting the truthful strategy. Hence, it is not possible to satisfy the first inequality of the Bayesian Monotonicity condition without violating the second inequality.
Since the agents' preferences satisfy the single crossing property in our model, for any incentive compatible allocation rule, it is possible to find a nearby allocation rule that satisfies strict incentive compatibility. To see how one might find such a nearby allocation rule, return to the example. Let f* = (y*,x*), where y* i and x* i are given below (y* j and x* j are defined symmetrically). We again consider the possibility of constructing a simple mechanism to achieve implementation. Example 2 tells us that some weakly incentive compatible allocation rules cannot be exactly implemented by any mechanism (finite or not) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, since they do not satisfy Bayesian Monotonicity. Hence, these allocation rules also cannot be implemented via the iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies.
Moreover, Theorem 6.1 of Jansen [1981] tells us that, in finite two-player games, if the unique Nash equilibrium (in both pure and mixed strategies) is in pure strategies, it has to be strict. Jansen's result implies the following observation.
OBSERVATION. If there are only two agents, strict incentive compatibility of an allocation rule is necessary for exact Bayesian Nash implementation in a finite mechanism.
Hence, at least in standard two-agent models like Demski-Sappington, the second- The impossibility of exact implementation using finite mechanisms (and our earlier example) leads us to consider relaxing the performance standard. For any incentive compatible rule, we look for a nearby allocation rule satisfying strict incentive compatibility--the single crossing property makes it possible to find such an allocation rule.
We then exactly implement this nearby allocation rule (approximately implement the given allocation rule), not only in Bayesian Nash equilibrium but also via two rounds of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies. The idea behind the mechanisms used to achieve implementation in the proof of Proposition 5 is as follows. Each agent submits two messages on his own type. The principal uses the two messages submitted by agent i in the following fashion. In order to determine the ε-neighborhood of agent i's consumption bundle, the principal uses agent i's second message and all other agents' first messages. In order to determine agent i's actual consumption bundle within that neighborhood, the principal uses only agent i's first message. The principal chooses allocations within each of the ε-neighborhoods that induce truth-telling, i.e., any strategy that has an agent sometimes reporting his first message falsely is strictly dominated by a strategy that is otherwise the same except that it has him always (for all types) reporting his first message truthfully. The delicate part of the construction is ensuring truth-telling across ε-neighborhoods--ensuring that (assuming all first messages are truthful) any strategy that has an agent sometimes reporting his second message falsely is strictly dominated by the strategy that is otherwise the same except that it has him always reporting his second message truthfully.
APPENDIX
In all proofs, we deal only with the case that ∂u i ( . ,θ i )/∂y i < 0 for all y i and all i.
The other cases follow immediately. In the construction of t, we need to pick ε > 0 small enough that the penalties more than offset any benefit the agents receive from the perturbations that are obtained when their reports do not match.
Proof of Proposition 1 (a)
We now verify that (M,g) achieves exact implementation via two rounds of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies. In the first round, by (2), any strategy that has agent i sometimes (in some state) reporting m i 1 falsely is strictly dominated by a strategy that is otherwise the same except that it has agent i always reporting m i 1 truthfully. Given that all agents report their own types truthfully, the ρ i component of g i ensures that, in the second round, any strategy that has agent i sometimes reporting m i 2 falsely is strictly dominated by a strategy that is otherwise the same except that it has agent i always reporting m i 2 truthfully. By (1), the implementation is exact. 
. (6) - (10) use the single crossing property and the openness of Y i × X i in much the same way as (4) . As in (5), the ordering of preferences under the single crossing property is important. In particular, since y i (h) and x i (h) are both increasing in h, (7) and (8) hold not just for h+1 but also for any h' > h, and (9) and (10) hold not just for h-1 but also for any h' < h. The construction of t i and, hence, g i is now complete, except for the specification of δ(k).
(7) -(10) ensure that any strategy that has an agent sometimes reporting his first message falsely is strictly dominated by a strategy that is otherwise the same except that it has that agent always reporting his first message truthfully. Given the first round of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies, we next ensure that any strategy that has an agent sometimes reporting his second message falsely is strictly dominated by a strategy that is otherwise the same, except that it has that agent always reporting his second message truthfully.
By (4) and (6) and the incentive compatibility of f, each agent has strict incentives to not overreport his type with his second message. By making δ an increasing function of agent i's second message, we next ensure that each agent has strict incentives to not underreport his type with his second message. Choose δ(z) = δ, and choose δ(z-1) ∈ (0,δ) small enough that an agent of type z prefers to set m i = (θ i z ,θ i z ) instead of (θ i z ,θ i z-1 ). This is possible by (4) and the incentive compatibility of f. Now, we pick δ(z-2) small enough that a z-1 type agent prefers to set m i = (θ i z-1 ,θ i z-1 ) instead of (θ i z-1 ,θ i z-2 ). By continuing this process (with smaller and smaller δs), we ensure that each agent has strict incentives to not underreport his type with his second message (given the first round of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies). Hence, (M,g) achieves approximate implementation in two rounds of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies.
